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Individuals differ in their ability to feel their own and others’ internal states, with those that
have more autistic and less empathic traits clustering at the clinical end of the spectrum.
However, when we consider semantic competence, this group could compensate with
a higher capacity to imagine the meaning of words referring to emotions. This is indeed
what we found when we asked people with different levels of autistic and empathic traits
to rate the degree of imageability of various kinds of words. But this was not the whole
story. Individuals with marked autistic traits demonstrated outstanding ability to imagine
theoretical concepts, i.e., concepts that are commonly grasped linguistically through
their definitions. This distinctive characteristic was so pronounced that, using tree-
based predictive models, it was possible to accurately predict participants’ inclination to
manifest autistic traits, as well as their adherence to autistic profiles – including whether
they fell above or below the diagnostic threshold – from their imageability ratings. We
speculate that this quasi-perceptual ability to imagine theoretical concepts represents
a specific cognitive pattern that, while hindering social interaction, may favor problem
solving in abstract, non-socially related tasks. This would allow people with marked
autistic traits to make use of perceptual, possibly visuo-spatial, information for “higher”
cognitive processing.
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INTRODUCTION
The imageability scale is a classical psycholinguistic measure for assessing the degree to which
words evoke mental images (Paivio et al., 1968; Connell and Lynott, 2012). Mental images (or
imageries) are non-verbal re-presentations (i.e., re-calls) of any kind of sensory experience we were
exposed to in the past (Roeckelein, 2004). They are associated with words, reflect the strength of
the link between specific words and sensory experiences, and have behavioral consequences as
high-imageability items are more easily processed and understood than low-imageability items
(Paivio, 1971, 1986, 1991, 2007). In this study we want to assess how this specific psycholinguistic
construct interacts with individuals’ ability to understand their own and others’ internal states.
Specifically, we want to explore whether the imageability ratings of specific word categories predict
an individual’s autistic or empathic traits, measuring levels of autistic and empathy traits along a
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continuum in which all of us lie that goes from very low to very
high (on the link between empathy and autism see e.g., Dalsant
et al., 2015; Gentili et al., 2015).
Usually the link between imagery and words is investigated in
relation to the external senses. Studies on imagery show, however,
that we form mental images of all kinds of sensory experiences,
including motor, kinaesthetic proprioceptive, interoceptive, and
emotional experiences (see e.g., Switras, 1978; Gollnisch and
Averill, 1993; Acerra and Moseley, 2005; Anema and Dijkerman,
2013). In line with these results, in previous research we showed
that the imageability scale developed by Paivio captures not
only the degree of imageability of words that denote things
that can be perceived by the external senses, but also that of
words that denote internal states, specifically those referring to
emotive, proprioceptive, and interoceptive states (Dellantonio
et al., 2014a,b; Pastore et al., 2015).
As individuals differ in their ability to recognize their own and
others’ internal states, with those with higher levels of autistic
traits and lower empathy traits clustering at the lower end of the
spectrum (Ronald et al., 2006), people belonging to this group
could compensate for this gap by being more able than others to
form mental images associated with emotive, proprioceptive, and
interoceptive words1. Since the imageability scale also assesses the
degree to which words referring to internal states evoke mental
images, the imageability rating of word classes denoting these
states could allow us to predict whether people have low or high
autistic traits, or, in other words, whether they have more or less
marked empathic inclinations.
Autistic Traits, Imageability, and Word
Classes
The main tools to detect individuals’ levels of autistic traits
are two self-report questionnaires developed by Baron-Cohen
et al. (2001), the Autism Quotient and the Empathy Quotient.
A person’s Autism Quotient score represents the quantity of
Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) traits s/he shows in her/his
behavior, whereas the Empathy Quotient measures empathy
traits related to the recognition of others’ emotions and moods,
the lack of which is involved in ASD impairments. As is already
suggested by the link between autism and empathy, people
with marked autistic traits are less able than others to identify
internal states. Specifically, they have difficulties recognizing
both their own and others’ emotions and introspective feelings
(Gaigg, 2012; Matsuda and Yamamoto, 2015). For this reason,
one would expect them to also have a lower capacity to imagine
(i.e., to dynamically form and mentally re-evoke) emotional and
introspective experiences.
The aim of this study is to test whether autistic traits correlate
with the capacity to imagine different kinds of words and
thus whether the imageability scale, and specifically the ratings
obtained by it (Paivio et al., 1968; Coltheart, 1981; Wilson, 1988;
Connell and Lynott, 2012), can be used as a means to predict how
many autistic or, at the other end of the continuum, empathic
traits a person possesses. A correlation of this kind would not only
1Because ‘proprioception’ can be used in a wide sense to include also interoception,
in the following we will speak in general of proprioceptive states/words.
offer a new and unexpected psycholinguistic instrument to assess
whether people are characterized by varying degrees of autistic
traits, but it would also provide important cues concerning the
cognitive ‘styles’ and the semantic competence of persons with
more or less marked autistic traits. Specifically, it might allow us
to understand whether and in which cases people with varying
degrees of autistic traits tend to strongly associate words with
perceptual representations.
Different words refer to concepts that rely to different
degrees on three main kinds of information: external sensory
information (e.g., ‘table,’ ‘fennel,’ and ‘candle’), internal sensory
information (i.e., proprioceptive and emotional information,
e.g., ‘pain,’ ‘hunger,’ ‘fever,’ and ‘cramp’ as well as ‘happiness,’
‘anger,’ and ‘disgust’) and linguistic information (e.g., ‘fallacy,’
hypothesis,’ ‘axiom,’ ‘fraud,’ and ‘democracy’; Barsalou, 1999,
2008; Prinz, 2002; Barsalou et al., 2003; Barsalou and Wiemer-
Hastings, 2005; Vigliocco et al., 2009; Kousta et al., 2011).
Imagery is a measure of the link between words and sensory
information, therefore words with high imagery ratings will be
more strongly linked with perception (either internal or external),
while words with low imagery ratings will rely more heavily on
linguistic information and be understood mainly on the basis
of linguistic definitions: they will be more abstract or, more
precisely, theoretical (‘abstract’ is often used for describing ‘non-
material’ objects; in this sense, words denoting emotions or
feelings would also be abstract). On the basis of this analysis
we identified four word classes: the first two include words
referring to internal states, i.e., specifically (i) proprioceptive and
(ii) emotional states; (iii) the third consists of theoretical words
and (iv) the last consists uniquely of concrete nouns; this last
group also serves as a control since it is matched with the others
for frequency and length.
Since people with autism have a limited capacity to recognize
internal feelings, we expect that they will be less able to imagine
words referring to emotional and proprioceptive states and that
therefore imageability ratings assigned to these word classes will
negatively correlate with autistic traits. On the other hand, there is
no evidence that more or less marked autistic traits will influence
the way people perceive the external world or the way they
grasp verbal definitions. Thus, imageability ratings of concrete
and of theoretical words should remain stable independently
of the degree of autistic traits. To assess this hypothesis, we
tested whether the imageability ratings assigned to the four
classes of words correlates with the degree of participants’
autistic/empathic traits as calculated by the Autism Quotient and
the Empathy Quotient.
Aim of the Study
This study aims at investigating whether more or less marked
autistic and/or empathic traits modulate semantic competence
with specific word classes. We hypothesize that individuals
with higher autistic traits and lower empathic skills have a
less developed capacity to imagine the meaning of words
referring to emotions and proprioceptive feelings. To test this
hypothesis, imageability judgements were submitted to recursive
partitioning (also known as tree-based models; Costello et al.,
2003) to analyze how the words’ category (theoretical, emotional,
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proprioceptive, and concrete) predicts the amount of autistic
(or empathy) traits. Given a set of independent variables (word
category) and a dependent variable (level of autistic or empathy
traits), tree-based models provide unique information about
the (1) hierarchy of contributions from independent variables
in explaining the distribution of the dependent variable and
(2) which value of the independent variable subdivides the
dependent variable into statistically different groups. To evaluate
whether the results were broadly general or clinically specific,
we selected adults along a continuum, from low to high autistic
traits.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
One-hundred and seventy-one participants aged between 18 and
58 years (N = 171; M = 31.6 years; SD = 10.9 years), 104 female
(M = 30.62 years; SD = 10.8 years), 67 male (M = 33.1 year;
SD = 10.9 years) participated in the study. Their educational
level was medium-high (with all the participants having at least
completed high school). Participants were recruited through
the Department of Psychology and Cognitive Science electronic
notice board. Furthermore, to increase variability in the level
of autistic/empathy traits, invitation to participate in the study
was electronically sent to an association of people with Asperger
Syndrome. Although we were able to differentiate among the
participants that were recruited from the Asperger Syndrome
association (N = 62; 31 m/31f) from those that were recruited
from the general population (N = 109; 36 m/73f), we were not
able to confirm their clinical diagnosis. For these reasons we
grouped all the participants together assuming a continuous
distribution of autistic and empathy traits between clinical
and sub-clinical (normal) populations. We used the Autism
Quotient Questionnaire (AQ) and the Empathy Questionnaire
(EQ) to assess each participant’s location along the spectrum of
Autistic/Empathy traits. Participants recruited from the Asperger
Syndrome association had significantly [F(1,169) = 151.1,
p < 0.001] higher levels of AQ (M = 35.4; SD = 7.3) than
participants from the subclinical group (M = 18.3; SD = 9.5)
and had significantly [F(1,169)= 125.7, p< 0.001] lower levels of
EQ (M = 21.8; SD = 10.2) than participants from the subclinical
group (M = 43.3; SD = 12.9). However, using the Kolmogorov–
Smirnov test we confirmed the normality of our AQ (D = 0.11,
p = 0.24) and EQ (D = 0.11, p = 0.19) score distributions. In
spite of this, we cannot exclude the possibility that the extreme
group of participants with a potential diagnosis of Asperger
Syndrome might have had a relatively strong effect on the final
results.
Participants were provided with information on the basic
background of the study and the procedure before giving their
consent. Participants did not receive any monetary incentive
to participate in the study. The study was approved by the
Internal Ethical Committee of the University of Padova, and
was conducted according to the principles expressed in the
Declaration of Helsinki. Informed consent was obtained from the
participants.
Materials
Words
One hundred and eighty Italian words were selected as
experimental stimuli. Each word fell in one of three categories
(N = 60): emotional words, proprioceptive words, theoretical
words. In addition, 180 words were selected as control stimuli.
Experimental and control stimuli were balanced in terms of
written frequency (67.2 vs. 67.3, respectively; t< |1| ) and in terms
of letter length (8.5 vs. 8.5; t < |1| ).
(i) Words denoting proprioceptive states were selected
starting from the examples considered in the studies of Berthoz
(2000) and Craig (2003, 2009, 2010). Some examples are
‘agitation,’ ‘balance,’ ‘blush,’ ‘cramp,’ ‘spasm,’ ‘pain,’ ‘hunger,’ ‘cold,’
‘fullness,’ ‘fever,’ ‘malaise,’ ‘relaxation,’ and ‘wheeze.’ (ii) The
group of emotion words includes both transient emotions
and moods. The list was freely composed starting from the
examples given in a number of salient studies on the matter.
We included only emotions that are considered to be culturally
stable (more basic; Tomkins, 1962, 1963; Plutchik, 1980; Ekman,
1984, 1994, 1999; Reizenzein, 2009; Kassam et al., 2013). As
for moods, we composed our list starting from the cases
discussed by Ekman (1994), Damasio (1999), and Prinz (2004).
Among the words we used were, e.g., ‘anguish,’ ‘amazement,’
‘joy,’ ‘happiness,’ ‘sadness,’ ‘unhappiness,’ ‘disappointment,’ ‘love,’
‘fear,’ ‘anger,’ ‘depression,’ ‘boredom,’ ‘distress,’ ‘indolence,’ and
‘relief.’ (iii) For the list of theoretical words we could not rely
on previous databases of abstract words. In fact, as we already
mentioned, theoretical words are not just abstract words, since
many words which are considered abstract (not directly related
to external perception), are indeed linked to internal – emotional
or proprioceptive – sensory information (e.g., ‘friendship,’ ‘love,’
‘freedom,’ or ‘wellness’ etc.; on this see also Vigliocco et al.,
2009; Kousta et al., 2011). Thus, the class of theoretical words
was defined a priori, with the intent of individuating a set of
terms which rely primarily on verbal definitions like ‘axiom,’
‘fallacy,’ hypothesis,’ ‘fraud,’ ‘democracy,’ ‘definition,’ ‘exception,’
‘unanimity,’ ‘protocol,’ etc. (iv) Finally, we created a control set
(matched for length and frequency with the others) composed
uniquely of concrete words, i.e., of words which strongly rely on
external sensory information. We included in this class terms like
‘table,’ ‘fennel,’ ‘candle,’ ‘juice,’ ‘cork,’ ‘pillow,’ ‘melon,’ ‘book,’ ‘stem
glass,’ and ‘airplane.’
Questionnaires
Autistic traits (AQ)
Participants were administered the full 50-item Autism Quotient
questionnaire (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001). Answering each
question on the survey was mandatory, so there were no missing
data for any participants who completed it. The results were
scored according to Baron-Cohen et al.’s (2001) criteria, resulting
in an “AQ score” for each participant. The AQ score represents
the level of autistic traits/characteristics that participants possess.
Empathy traits (EQ)
Participants answered the 40-item short version of the Empathy
Quotient questionnaire (Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright, 2004).
The results were scored to obtain an “EQ score” for each
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participant, which represents their level of empathy traits, i.e., the
ability to understand others’ emotions and moods.
Procedure
The survey was created and run between July 2014 and November
2014 using Google Forms Online Surveys.
Participants were asked to fill in two questionnaires (AQ, and
EQ, Baron-Cohen et al., 2001; Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright,
2004) and to rate the imageability of a set of 360 words.
Imageability was rated for each word on a 7-point Likert-like
scale (one is the low and seven is the high imagery end of the
scale). Instructions to participants were the Italian translation
of Paivio et al.’s (1968) original instructions: “Nouns differ in
their capacity to arouse mental images of things or events. Some
words arouse a sensory experience, such as a mental picture or
sound, very quickly and easily, whereas others may do so only
with difficulty (i.e., after a long delay) or not at all. The purpose of
this experiment is to rate a list of words as to the ease or difficulty
with which they arouse mental images. Any word which, in
your estimation, arouses a mental image (i.e., a mental picture,
or sound, or other sensory experience) very quickly and easily
should be given a high imagery rating: any word that arouses a
mental image with difficulty or not at all should be given a low
imagery rating. Think of the words ‘apple’ or ‘fact.’ Apple would
probably arouse an image relatively easily and would be rated as
high imagery; fact would probably do so with difficulty and would
be rated as low imagery” (Paivio et al., 1968, p. 4; for an analysis
of these instructions and of how people might plausibly interpret
them to assign their ratings, see Pastore et al., 2015).
The experiment was conducted in two parts, each involving
completion of an online form. In the first part, participants
dealt with the form containing the AQ and a random selection
of 180 words; in the second part, they dealt with the EQ and
the remaining 180 words. Only the data from participants that
completed all the four tasks (AQ, EQ, rating of word set 1 and
word set 2) were used for the analyses.
Analytic Plan
First, for the whole group, we calculated correlations of AQ
scores and EQ scores with the mean imageability ratings. We
then determined correlations of AQ scores and EQ scores with
the mean of the judgments of imageability for each of the word
clusters (theoretical, emotional, proprioceptive, and control) for
male and female participants. Statistical significance was set at
p < 0.01.
Finally, imageability ratings were submitted to recursive
partitioning (also known as tree-based models; Costello et al.,
2003) to analyze how either the words’ category (theoretical,
emotional, proprioceptive, control) or the single words predict
the AQ and EQ scores.
RESULTS
Preliminary Analysis
The data were explored and analyzed using R-project (version
3.1.1). Prior to data analysis, univariate and multivariate
distributions of AQ, EQ and imageability judgment scores were
examined for normality, homogeneity of variance, outliers, and
influential cases (Fox, 1997). All these variables were normally
distributed. The distance of each case to the center was evaluated
to screen for multidimensional outliers (Fox, 1997). Autism
Quotient scores and Empathy Quotient scores were, as expected,
negatively correlated, r=−0.85, p< 0.001 sharing 72.3% of their
common variance.
No significant differences emerged between female and
male participants for the imageability judgment scores (F
range = 0.01–1.8; ns). However, significant differences emerged
between male and female for AQ [male M = 27.4; SD = 11.9;
female M = 22.7; SD = 11.8; F(1,169) = 6.4; p < 0.05] and for
EQ [male M = 30.5; SD = 14.3; female M = 38.6; SD = 16.0;
F(1,169)= 11.2; p < 0.001].
Correlational Analysis
For the whole group, neither AQ nor EQ were significantly
correlated with mean imageability ratings (respectively, r = 0.07,
ns and r =−0.08, ns).
Figure 1 shows the linear correlations among the AQ scores
and imageability ratings for each of the word clusters (theoretical,
emotional, proprioceptive, and control) for male and female
participants. There was a significant positive correlation for males
(but not for females) between AQ and the imageability ratings of
theoretical words (r= 0.37, p< 0.01), with the explained variance
as low as 13.7%. There was a significant positive correlation for
males (but not for females) between AQ and the imageability
ratings of emotional words (r = 0.31, p < 0.01), with the
explained variance as low as 9.6%. AQ was not significantly
correlated for either males or for females with the imageability
ratings of either proprioceptive words (male r = 0.20, ns; female
r = 0.04, ns), or control words (male r = 0.02, ns; female
r =−0.17, ns).
Figure 2 shows the linear correlations among the EQ scores
and the imageability ratings for each of the word clusters
(theoretical, emotional, proprioceptive, and control) for male and
female participants. There was a significant negative correlation
for males (but not for females) between EQ and the imageability
ratings of theoretical words (r = −0.43, p < 0.01), with the
explained variance as low as 18.5%. There was a significant
negative correlation for males (but not for females) between EQ
and the imageability ratings of emotional words (r = −0.33,
p < 0.01), with the explained variance as low as 10.9%. EQ was
not significantly correlated for either males or for females with
the imageability ratings of either proprioceptive words (male
r = −0.22, ns; female r = −0.05, ns), or control words (male
r =−0.01, ns; female r = 0.21, ns).
Tree-Base Model Analysis
Category-Words Level
Figure 3 shows the optimal tree that describes how imageability
ratings of the word categories (theoretical, emotional,
proprioceptive, and control) predict the AQ (Figure 3A) and EQ
(Figure 3B) scores. For both AQ and EQ scores, the judgment
of theoretical words was the best measure that statistically
differentiated the distribution. Specifically, participants with
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FIGURE 1 | Distributions of the Autism Spectrum Quotient (AQ) score and imageability ratings for each of the words clusters (theoretical, emotional,
proprioceptive, and control) for male and female participants.
FIGURE 2 | Distributions of the Empathy Quotient (EQ) score and imageability ratings for each of the words clusters (theoretical, emotional,
proprioceptive, and control) for male and female participants.
higher AQ (and conversely lower EQ) scores gave higher
imageability ratings of the theoretical words (>4.6) than those
with lower AQ (and higher EQ) scores. Next, the imageability
ratings of the control and the theoretical words hierarchically
stratified the AQ and EQ distributions, respectively. Finally, only
for those participants with lower AQ (<30), the imageability
ratings of the emotional and proprioceptive words affected the
stratification of the population. Gender hierarchically stratified
the distribution only for the EQ scores, with females having
higher scores.
Single-Word Level
Figure 4 shows the optimal tree which describes how imageability
ratings at the single word level (all 360 words were considered
independently) predicts the AQ (Figure 4A) and EQ (Figure 4B)
scores. For both AQ and EQ scores, the ratings of the
single word anguish were the best measure that statistically
differentiated the distribution. Specifically, participants with
higher AQ (and conversely lower EQ) scores gave lower (<5.55)
imageability ratings to the word anguish than those with
lower AQ (higher EQ) scores. Next for the AQ scores, the
imageability judgments of the words toy (>4.5), amazement
(<3.5), and unanimity (<2.5), hierarchically stratified the
population. For the EQ scores, the imageability judgments of
the words toy (>4.5) and chocolate candy (>6.5) hierarchically
stratified the population. Gender hierarchically stratified the
distribution only for the EQ scores, with females having higher
scores.
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FIGURE 3 | (A) The optimal tree that describes how imageability ratings of words’ category (theoretical, emotional, proprioceptive, and control) predict the AQ. The
regression tree or tree-based model provides information about (1) the hierarchy of the importance of independent variables in explaining the distribution of the
dependent variable and (2) which value of the independent variable divides the dependent variable in two groups that differ statistically. The bottom rectangle shows
the distribution of expressed distress from lower (left) to higher (right). The values in the oval leaves of the tree refer to the condition of the independent variable that
statistically divides the distribution of the dependent variable. Below each oval leaf, the indications “yes” or “no” refer to whether or not the condition is met. For the
categorical variable “Gender” m, male and f, female. Each leaf is divided in two sub-leaves. The terminal leaves (quadrangles) represent subgroups that cannot be
further subdivided. The n-value in the terminal leaves represents the size of the group, and M is the mean value of the group for the dependent variable. (B) The
optimal tree for EQ.
FIGURE 4 | (A) The optimal tree that describes how imageability ratings of single words’ predict the AQ. (B) The optimal tree for EQ.
DISCUSSION
The notion of mental imagery describes both the capacity to
dynamically form and mentally recall representations of past
sensory experience and the quasi-perceptual representations
evoked by this process. Since they are private and subjective
experiences, mental images are particularly difficult to investigate
scientifically, even though they are crucial for understanding
non-verbal thought and the relationship between verbal and
non-verbal thought. This study offers a contribution to the
comprehension of this phenomenon. Indeed, it allows us to
establish a link between people’s lower vs. higher autistic traits
(which we know to be related to a higher/lower ability to feel their
own and others’ internal states, respectively) and their capacity
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to imagine specific word classes, i.e., to link specific words
with quasi-perceptual information related to them. As has been
reported in other studies on cognitive style in Autism (Kana et al.,
2006; Mottron et al., 2006), this group probably compensates for
the lack of direct emotional experience by developing a higher
capacity to imagine emotions in a visual manner. This same
tendency – even if to a lesser and non-significant degree – is
discernible also in the case of proprioceptive terms referring to
bodily (proprioceptive and interoceptive) states.
Conversely, we were also able to ascertain that people with
high levels of autistic traits and lower levels of empathic traits
have a more developed capacity to imagine theoretical words
and this is compatible with the common knowledge that they
are outstanding in understanding theoretical issues and in
accomplishing abstract tasks. Thus, we can conclude that the
capacity to dynamically form and mentally recall representations
of past sensory experience associated with a word is in general
positively related with a better grasp of the phenomena denoted
by the words.
Furthermore, this study may also be relevant from a clinical
perspective since the imageability ratings of word classes
denoting proprioceptive, emotional and theoretical words allow
us to predict whether people have low or high autistic traits,
or, to put it differently, whether they have more or less
marked empathic inclinations. In the DSM-5 it is at last
acknowledged that people with autistic traits tend to belong
to a spectrum. However, there are no specific markers that
can easily predict where in the spectrum a person falls.
Our study shows that a simple task such as rating mental
imagery may be useful for performing a stratification of the
population.
The effects we found are higher for the male than for the
female participants. This is consistent with the so-called “extreme
male brain theory of autism” and with the finding that autistic
traits in men are generally more severe than those in women
(Baron-Cohen, 2002).
Some limitations of this study point to future directions
of study. Firstly, we can imagine that cognitive level may be
a strong predictor of word imageability, so it is a limitation
that no measures of cognitive performance were taken into
account. However, in the current study we decided not to
collect any IQ measure for technical reasons. Specifically, our
procedure was very long (∼2 h in two sessions) and many
participants had to be excluded because they did not finish
the experiment. Adding another IQ test would have made
our experiment even longer. However, we strongly believe that
a follow-up study should include measures of the cognitive
performance of the participants. Secondly, we tested our sample
on ratings for a large number of words, and the task was
long and demanding. To have clinical value, we believe the
stratification of the population should be done based on the
imagery rating of a smaller number of words. This will be
possible by selecting only a subgroup of the words we have used,
more specifically those words that lie at the extremes of the
continuum. Furthermore, to evaluate possible clinical insights
and applications, it would be useful to use this methodology
with children. Indeed, conducting assessments at various ages
during childhood could allow us to define the ontogeny of
the imagery capacity across development and thus might be
helpful in trying to identify atypical developmental trajectories.
Finally, our research could be tested at the neurophysiological
level in order to both identify brain neural networks that render
the mental imagination of one class of words differently than
another and to determine how they vary in different clinical
groups.
CONCLUSION
We used Paivio’s imagery scale to investigate whether autistic
traits correlate with the capacity to imagine different kinds of
words. The outcome is even more intriguing than we anticipated
since it indicates that the ratings assigned by people to certain
world classes can predict that person’s inclination to manifest
autistic traits, including whether they fall above or below the
diagnostic threshold.
People with more autistic traits have a higher capacity than
typical matching controls to imagine theoretical, emotional
and proprioceptive words. This may support the claim that
people with high functioning autism compensate for their
difficulties in understanding their internal states by using specific
cognitive strategies related to imagery, more specifically by using
associations to words referring to external sensory information.
This finding certainly invites further investigation since it could
lead to important insights for the development of psychological
treatments. Furthermore, our results also suggest something
more specific, i.e., that the reason people with high functioning
autism show increased skills for theoretical tasks is not due to a
highly developed capacity to recall verbal definitions or to build
meaningful links among words; instead, these increased skills
result from a capacity to form perceptual images of theoretical
concepts.
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